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Histoires pragmatiques
A Conversation with Simona Cerutti and Yves Cohen
Roberto Gronda, Tullio Viola, Yves Cohen and Simona Cerutti
EDITOR'S NOTE
Based at the EHESS in Paris, Simona Cerutti and Yves Cohen are among today’s most
authoritative advocates of a “pragmatic” or “pragmatist” approach to historical research.
By these terms we mean both a focus on the practices of actors as an object of study, and
a methodological concern for the ways the actors themselves justify those practices on
the level of theory. The way “histoire pragmatique” has drawn on classical philosophical
Pragmatism will be at the centre of this interview.
Cerutti’s area of specialization is the history of modern Italy. In particular, she has
studied the genesis of social groups and the transformation of the understanding of
justice in Piedmont, with a focus on the link that Ancien Régime societies established
between the actual possession of a status and its theorization. Her two most recent books
are Giustizia sommaria. Pratiche e ideali di giustizia in una societè di Ancien Régime
(Milan 2003), and Etrangers. Étude d’une condition d’incertitude dans une société
d’Ancien Régime (Paris 2012).
Yves Cohen is a historian of the twentieth century. His research has been principally
devoted to a comparative investigation of the 20th Century’s passion for leadership and
command in different geographical contexts. In his Le siècle des chefs. Une histoire
transnationale du commandement et de l’autorité (Paris 2013) he compares Stalin’s USSR
and Hitler’s Germany to the liberalism and the development of Taylorism in France and
America, from the viewpoint of intellectual history and from that of a history of
practices. He recently published Histoires pragmatiques (Paris, 2016) with Francis
Chateauraynaud.
The interview was conducted in French and later translated by Roberto Gronda and Tullio
Viola.
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Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – Your work is frequently referred to as “pragmatic history.”
This notion,  however,  is by no means a new one:  Polybius spoke of pragmatikê historia,
Germany had pragmatische Geschichte in the tradition of Kantian anthropology. Can you tell
us something about how you understand this label, and about your own encounter with
“pragmatic history”?
Simona CERUTTI – Personally, I had quite an idiosyncratic introduction to pragmatic
history, although this encounter was not unique to me. It was related to the experience
of a group of researchers (many of whom, myself included, were pupils of Giovanni
Levi), all working within the framework of microhistory, and who were at that time
trying to develop an analytic approach to history. The keyword here is “analytic.” We
owed much to Edoardo Grendi:  our goal in doing analytic history was to recover a
strong form of empiricism. At the same time, it is important to note that, according to
this view, empiricism is not the starting point of inquiry – its degree zero – but rather
something that must be achieved. We should be wary of the familiarity we feel toward
the past:  rather, what we should do as historians is investigate the meaning of the
words and concepts  we find in the source.  The idea of  entering a foreign country
expresses this attitude toward the past very well, as well as the kind of work needed to
build up empiricism. Hence a particular attention to the sources, to the actions they
report,  to  the  fact  that  sources  themselves  are  actions  whose  meaning  should  be
reconstructed.  I  have to  say that  such a  program of  research was  fostered by the
criticism of positivistic social history, which was completely inattentive to the specific
language of social actors.
Yves COHEN – My encounter with pragmatic history was also idiosyncratic. An indirect
source of inspiration – one I have become aware of only recently – is the pragmatism of
Mao Tze Tung. I was Maoist when I was young. My motto when I was seventeen was “No
Inquiry, No Right to Speak!.” Mao’s conception of inquiry has a distinctly pragmatist
tone,  possibly  related  to  the  fact  that  he  attended  Dewey’s  lectures  in  China  in
1919-1920.1 According to Mao, inquiry came first, even before theory. At that time, I
belonged to the Proletarian left (gauche prolétarienne), and we were completely taken
with this tradition of thought. 
Apart from that, I would say that my encounter with pragmatic history was not only
idiosyncratic,  but also unique. Contrary to Simona, I  did not belong to any specific
group of scholars. Obviously, I paid great attention to what other people were doing
around me – for instance, the social studies of science or microhistory – but I do not see
any single, decisive influence that drove me towards pragmatic history. Rather, what
was  decisive  was  my discovery  in  1979  of  the  personal  archive  of  the  director  of
production at the Peugeot factory, Ernest Mattern, which made it possible for me to
study concrete practices.
In the early 1980s, I started to think of my work as a history of practices, largely in
resonance with Foucault. On the one hand, Foucault dismissed the study of what he
called  pratiques  réelles.  On  the  other,  in  1980,  he  claimed  for  himself  the  title  of
“historian of practices” (see, for instance, his 1978 discussion with historians published
by Michelle Perrot).2 Still, his approach remains peculiar, as he claimed that practices
should be analyzed from the viewpoint of discourse. But, his idea of practices being at
the crossroads of what is said and what is done has been very influential for me. This
made me reflect on the fact that alongside “material” acts – which I was studying in
industrial settings – we have linguistic ones, as pragmatic linguists said. So I started
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thinking  about  the  relationship  between  linguistics,  practice  and  history.  These
influences allowed me to adopt a truly analytical approach in my historical work.
Simona  CERUTTI –  I  have  to  say  that  I  see  things  rather  differently.  For  me,  the
pragmatist  or  pragmatic  approach is  in  opposition to  Foucault,  who I  regard as  a
teleological historian. He is teleological because you already know who the murderer is
– to quote, once again, Giovanni Levi – since the relationships of power are established
from the beginning. There is an issue of Quaderni Storici entirely devoted to the analysis
of the systems of charity,  which highlights the difference between a historical  and
analytical approach to historical sources and Foucault’s approach. The essays which
constitute that issue study the practices within a particular institution such as the
hospital,  investigating  in  concreto the  government  of  a  hospital,  the  relationship
between  governors  and  government.  That  issue  of  Quaderni  Storici was  explicitly
intended to challenge and contrast the teleological model of Foucault.
Yves COHEN – I see your point. Foucault can be read in so many different ways, and
many of them are terrible! Personally, however, I do not think it is correct to speak of
teleology in the case of Foucault. Some of his works grew from questioning the present
and clearly triggered a retrospective history, but others opened fields of inquiry that
had been little investigated by historians, such as “practices of the self,” with a problem
setting grounded in the past.
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – This is a point on which we would like to dwell somewhat
longer. Often, when people refer to pragmatism in history or in the social sciences, they see
it through the lenses of thinkers who are not pragmatist in a strict sense, even though they
do share some features with pragmatism. One such thinker is Foucault; another – at least
here in France – is sociologist Luc Boltanski.
Simona CERUTTI – Boltanski has indeed been extremely important for me (I even wrote a
review of his work).  I  think we can summarize Boltanski’s  message as taking actors
seriously.  Such an approach is in contrast to that which forms a large part of social
history, one which aims rather at correcting and integrating the point of view of the
actors. But even more than Boltanski, ethnomethodology (and in particular Garfinkel’s
texts)  exerted  a  significant  influence  on  my  work:  I  learned  much  from  the
ethnomethodological analysis of the roles of the observer and her subject-matter, of
observation and, above all, of description. This is, I suppose, the path along which I am
led to action, to its creativity,  to its significance:  what we have to do is locate the
genesis of normativity within action, not outside.
Yves COHEN – Personally, the encounter with Boltanski was not as important for me as it
was for you. It might be that I consider the order of justification (which is Boltanski’s
and Thévenot’s  paramount  interest)  as  simply  one amongst  many reference orders
present within practices. Equally important is, for instance, how the actors formulate
the situated concerns that they have when they act, and how they define the kind of
relationships that they have with the institution or the group to which they belong.
This is why I do not agree with those who consider this “pragmatic sociology” to be the
only way to understand practices from a pragmatist/pragmatic point of view. Take, for
instance, the performativity in linguistic pragmatics: it can be used to investigate non-
linguistic acts such as the spatial acts – for example, going to the street to protest, or
leaving  one’s  own space  to  meet  people  in  theirs,  and so  on.  What  I  found more
inspiring than Boltanski and Thévenot – and I do not mean to deny the importance of
On justification for  the  present  situation of  the  social  sciences  –  was the  theory of
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situated action as formulated by Lucy Suchman in her book Plans and Situated Action
(1987). I was really impressed by the fact that, according to that approach, all that is
pre-established – knowledge,  norms,  plans,  languages,  spaces,  etc.  –  must  again be
tested through action. I realized that we have to re-situate action and practice, and to
start our investigations from that level. The curiosity for the founders of pragmatism
came much later, with the new wave of interest around 2000.
⁂
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – Let’s go back for a moment to your respective fields of
research. Your texts show a strong, intrinsic link between methodology and subject-matter.
Along  with  adopting  a  “pragmatic”  or  “pragmatist”  perspective,  you  study  historical
phenomena that, however different, display a specific relationship between “practice” and
“norms” or “discourses.” Do you think that pragmatic methodology can also be extended to
historical objects or epochs in which this relationship appears in very different ways?
Simona CERUTTI – Indeed, many of my reflections on the notion of practice originate
from my work on summary justice and from the discovery of the treatment of practice
made by  post-glossarists.  Particularly  important  in  this  context  is  Baldus’  “pratica
consumata”: according to this conception of practice, the legitimacy of an action stems
from its repetition, provided that there is the consensus of the actors. The discovery of
this subject-matter somehow created a short-circuit between the body of pragmatist
texts that provided the theoretical horizon of my inquiry and my analysis of the status
of action. A second point that I would like to highlight is the idea that historical sources
themselves can be conceived as actions.  When conceived in this  way,  they are not
merely – and, I would say, not primarily – reports of what happened, but rather actions
that dramatically change the relationship between text and context.
Yves COHEN – You hit on an important point here. In the 20th century the relationship
between theory and practice was a concrete issue, not something that only concerned
scholars and historians. In my work, I investigated the history of practices that are
organized by other practices, the latter being practices of the production of norms. I
was  fascinated  by  the  fact  that  the  20th  century  brought  about  great  domains  of
practice organized by enormous apparati such as Taylorism and Communism. At the
same time, pragmatism was a philosophy that did not aim at justifying the need for the
organization of practice, but rather attempted to understand its functioning. It is not
by chance, therefore, that the rediscovery of pragmatism took place at the end of the
20th century, that is, at the end of a century that was essentially committed to the
organization and normalization of practices. It is a historical fact and, at the very same
time, a matter of concern for the historian.
Simona CERUTTI – I would like to make a distinction that may be useful here. We are
dealing with two different notions: on the one hand, concrete practices and, on the
other  hand,  pragmatism,  which  I  regard  as  a  method.  So  we  could formulate  the
question in these terms: are practices a subject-matter or a method? I take practice to
be a method:  consequently,  when I  started reflecting on the practice of  producing
legitimacy  and  on  the  relationship  between  norms  and  practice,  my  historical
investigations started thematizing something that was originally a method.
Yves COHEN – I had to face a similar problem in my work. The difficulty stems from the
fact that subject-matter and method somehow conflate. The adoption of a pragmatist
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method makes  it  possible  to  perceive  that  there  are  practices  at  work  in  history.
Practice  is  not  a  subject-matter  that  we historians  can freely  choose among many
others; it is the very substance of history. Practices – rather than theories – define how
things  are.  Again,  pride  of  place  goes  to  the  practices:  theories  are  called  for  by
practices, and not vice versa – as many believe.
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – In many of your answers, Yves, you seem to presume the
existence  of  a  plurality  of  practices.  Your  book  argues  that  the  20th  century  is
characterized  by  a  strong  dichotomy  between  practices  that  produce  normativity,  and
thereby control other practices,  and practices that simply apply what has been decided
elsewhere. The recognition of this dichotomy paves the way for the study of the practical
side  of  leadership,  as  well  as  for  the  analysis  of  the  normative  aspects  embedded  in
accepting the decisions of the authority in charge of the production of normativity. So, you
seem to be led to a slightly paradoxical conclusion: it is like you were saying that it is
precisely such a split that makes us realize that the two kinds of practices cannot be split.
Yves COHEN – You are perfectly right, but it is not a contradiction for which I can be
held responsible! It is a contradiction of the actors: it is a contradiction in the things
themselves! Take, for instance, management. Management has a strong, almost natural
relationship with a practical attitude. It does not care much about theory. Managers are
very interested in the theory of  management – Taylorism, for instance – and they
produce theory. However, they know that it is not theory that makes the difference, but
rather the solutions that can be found by analyzing the concrete problems at stake: on
the spot, theory may help or not. One excellent example is the Berliet factory. Berliet
wanted to be a Fordist and a Taylorist; he built a huge factory replete with machines
coming from the United States. He imported American normativity, so to say. But the
factory never worked because the steel that was necessary to build the automobiles was
not the same that was available in the United States, and he could not import all the
steel he needed from America. So, his project turned out to be a disaster, and simply
because he wanted to apply a theory! He failed because he privileged theory over the
situated conditions.  In  Stalinist  communism –  we should always  keep in  mind the
distinction between Stalinism and Maoism on this specific viewpoint – we have the
same idea of a practice controlled and directed by theory. Nonetheless, if we study its
practice, we see on the one hand that it is no less pragmatic than the others, since
theory was always called by the demands of the concrete situation. The control by
theory was just a propaganda argument.
On the other hand, this approach has been harmful for the social sciences, especially
here in France. For a long time, theory was said to be in charge of telling us what is real
– what the essence of class conflict is, for instance. So, to go and look for what was
happening in the concrete practices was deemed as a waste of time. The appeal of
theory blocked the road of inquiry.  Take,  for instance,  the introduction written by
Henry Wallon to the important collective book À la lumière du marxisme (1938-39). In this
text, we see clearly how Wallon formulates and constitutes what we might call the “ban
of inquiry.” Its bearings on French social sciences have still to be appraised.
Simona CERUTTI – May I ask you a question? From what you have just said, it seems that
you take pragmatism and inquiry as being substantially equivalent, as if they were the
same thing. When you talk about Mao, for instance, you say that he was pragmatist
because he praised inquiry. I am not sure that this is correct.
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Yves COHEN – No, I do not think that pragmatism can be boiled down to inquiry. Among
other  things,  pragmatism  is  also  the  idea  that  we  should  not  take  categories  for
granted, and that we should investigate the modes of constitution of things. Another
important aspect is the study of the relationship between practice and theory, in the
way that it  is perceived by the actors.  I  studied that problem as it  relates to some
contemporary  constellations  of  events  such  as  Stalinism  and  Fordist  production
practices.  And  the  problem  is  connected  to  another  important  issue,  namely  the
relationship between discourse and practice. I have to say that I am deeply annoyed by
how people  now use  and  abuse  the  expression  “let’s  study  the  discourse  and  the
practice of” – say, the discourse and the practice of social protection. I am not saying
that we should get rid of the conceptual couple discourse/practice, nor that we should
blur  the  distinction.  The  other  way  around!  We  should  delve  deeper  into  that
relationship. As you say, we cannot simply pit norms (or discourses) against practices.
According to Foucault, discourse is a discursive practice, and it is for this very reason
that discourse becomes relevant.  At the same time, when we turn our attention to
concrete practices (for instance, the practices of organization of work), we see that they
have a strong material and spatial dimension, but they are constitutively accompanied
by discourse. This is a real pluralism of practices. Practices turns out to be a plurality of
interlocked practices: practices are made, among other components, by discourses –
which are practices!
Simona CERUTTI – This is also the idea of looking for validation (légitimation) in concrete
practices, which is an important aspect of what we do when we read historical sources.
I think this is a truly pragmatist tenet. Reading the sources as actions that raise a claim
for legitimacy dramatically changes the way in which we do history. 
By legitimacy I do not mean formal legitimacy. Legitimacy can be informal, and in the
latter case the claims for legitimacy do not refer to a legal order. The point is that
actions may create a social status, instead of simply mirroring something else. If you
stress the continuity between action and interest, and conceive of actions as sort of
emanations of the interests of the agents – that is, of their identity and their social
condition – then you can actually develop an analysis  of  actions.  It  might even be
possible to have an analysis of actions in terms of practices.
This goes back to the criticism that has been raised against E. P. Thompson: If  you
create a continuity between action and individual interest, and conceive of action as a
sort of emanation of individual interests (or of their social position, etc.), you end up
with  a  conception  of  action  which  you  might  certainly  call  “practice,”  but  which
remains the reflex of something that already exists – such as social order, hierarchy,
etc.  If,  in contrast,  you approach the reports of actions that you find in sources as
something that contains a reason in itself, and is not a mere overflow of experience, but
rather the organization of an experience – in that case, you have broken the continuity
between action and social order. You have introduced a gap, a cleavage between the
two layers. Therefore, you are in the position to reflect on the creativity of action as a
necessary condition for the production of claims of legitimacy, normative demands, etc.
By breaking the chain that directly links action to individuals, you can start looking at
action as the product of a specific situation.
Yves COHEN – I totally agree with you. But I would like to complicate the picture slightly.
I think that it is incorrect to say that everything that is said or written is discourse. In
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one  interview  given  to  Roger  Pol-Droit,  Foucault  remarks  that  it  is  important  to
distinguish things said (choses dites) and discourse. Things said are what we do when we
talk to each other in a boulangerie: “How much is this croissant?” There is no discourse
here; there are just things that are said.
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – Moreover, it seems to us that discourse has at least two
different meanings. On the one hand, it may refer to what you find in the sources; on the
other, it means theory. In turn, theory can be investigated from two different perspectives: it
can be studied historically  – as the subject-matter  of  the research – or  as the overall
framework of the historian. So, there is the relationship between discursive practices and
material practices, and there is also the relationship between theory and practice.
Yves COHEN – This was precisely my point! In the 20th century, the relationship between
theory and practice was considered a historical  matter;  but  it  is  not  an issue that
concerns only the historian. For instance, the communists used to say that words do
not  matter,  only  facts  matter.  It  was  an  attempt,  which  we  now  perceive  as
meaningless, to contrast words and facts. But this is a trick, a fraud! What is interesting
from my point of view is to understand, historically, whence the idea that words do not
matter comes. I feel that there is something extremely important related to the effort
to weaken and erase free thinking. If you do not think that words are acts of speech, it
follows that words do not matter. The fact that you have the right to speak will not
make any real difference. Put in this form, it is clear that this is an argument of power
through which practices can be organized. This is something that we should clarify
historically in order to free ourselves from its grip.
Simona CERUTTI – With regard to the notion of practice, a recent article by Roberto
Frega (who is a philosopher) shows an interesting difference from the perspective of
the historian.  By this,  I  mean the distinction that Frega draws between action and
practice. Action, he says,  has to do with the individual,  while practice is collective.
However,  modernist  historians  are  often  confronted  with  sources  that  showcase  a
distance between action and individual responsibility. Let me offer an example: the
case of wedding pledges in the 16th and 17th centuries. Sources tell us of cases in which
a girl was sitting, doing nothing, and a man would throw a ring at her. The interesting
point is that if she was touched by the ring, that could count in court as a form of
“action” and a valid proof of the engagement. The rationale here is that she did not
react against the action performed by the man. She is “struck” by the action, and is
therefore “held” by that action, provided the action unfolded “without contradiction” –
this is the crucial phrase. If an act is produced “without contradiction,” it can change
social statuses, irrespective of individual intentions. This example suggests an answer
to your question about the dialogue between historians and pragmatist philosophers: In
this case, in fact, we can see that there is a gap between action and individual, which
goes against twentieth-century philosophy as a whole. 
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – This is interesting also from a methodological perspective:
Pragmatist  philosophers  tend  to  take  “action”  or  “habit”  as  universally  valid  concepts,
although  they  also  endorse  a  genealogical  approach  to  philosophical  categories.
Conversely, you are now insisting on the role of pragmatism as a method that prevents us
from taking our categories for granted and from projecting them all too easily onto other
historical periods.
Simona CERUTTI – I think so, and let me further expand on the previous example. My
current work centres on the notion of responsibility: responsibility and justice in the
long term. Now, while the term “responsible” as an adjective has always existed, the
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word “responsibility” suddenly appears at the end of the 18th century. And I suspect –
although this is  yet to be demonstrated – that there is  a relationship between the
sudden introduction of that word and the birth of the concept of action as related to
individual intention. To test this hypothesis, I have been working in territories such as
bankruptcies and merchant insurances, to explore which conception of “responsibility”
is at play therein. And what I noticed is that the idea of “intention” is always related to
culpability,  not to responsibility.  This means that the concept of action is somehow
autonomous.  People were more concerned with putting the action right  than with
finding a responsible individual or culprit.
⁂
 Roberto GRONDA &  Tullio  VIOLA – Let’s  delve a bit  deeper  into the relationship between
practice and normativity. You both insist that we should not draw a neat divide between
practices and norms, because a practice can always “turn into” a norm. Yet this is hardly
enough to acquiesce philosophers, who are on the lookout for precise ways to define when,
exactly, a practice turns into a norm. Can you single out any qualitative difference between
the two dimensions?
Simona  CERUTTI –  Sources  of  the  ancien  régime suggest  that  an  essential  aspect  of
actions’ transformation into norms is consensus and repetition over time – I mean the
fact that an action has unfolded in a continuous way over time, backed by consensus.
This  dynamic somehow triggers  a  process  of  generalization.  There is  a  moment in
which actions are granted a weight as precedents; they are recognized as having a general
purport.  Which is interesting,  because today we tend to conceive of the path from
particularity to generality as related to accumulation, not to repetition and consensus.
(Think again of the distinction between individual actions and collective practices.)
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – We are close to the problem of convention, aren’t we?
Simona CERUTTI – We certainly are, although a very interesting article by Louis Quéré,
A-t-on vraiment besoin de la notion de convention?,3 suggests that we do not need to talk
about convention if we undertake an analysis of action. Action creates convention. As
for me, I would give pride of place to the idea of consensus – and ultimately, to the
public. Consensus has the power to transform the status of action. Now the question is:
In contemporary societies, does that suffice? Do we need a formal act of recognition
that turns an action into a convention? In ancien régime sources, this is continuously
evoked. “I do this without contradiction” – this phrase may become a bit of evidence in all
sorts of territorial conflicts, etc. A recent book by Tamara Herzog, Frontiers of Possession,
shows that all national boundaries in ancien régime are established by specific acts of
ownership, which have unfolded without contradiction.
Yves COHEN – I have a slightly different viewpoint. I have always been puzzled by the
conventionalist emphasis on agreement: it seems to me that this is an overly irenic
view of social life. I would rather stress the confrontational nature of society. Which
does not mean that overt conflict, or war, is all-pervasive. Confrontation often leads to
compromise. Even authority may be conceived in terms of the compromises reached in
order to let things work. Authority is shaped in open conflict and settled in its breaks,
forming a compromise (which may also be implicit, not formal). So this is my view of
things: a confrontational dimension, with moments of overt conflict and moments of
compromise.
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 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – Is this the reason why you emphasize that the notion of
ends is not part of the definition of the notion of practice?
Yves  COHEN –  Exactly.  I  want  to  reject  views such as  that  of  McIntyre’s,  who sees
practice first of all as a “community of ends.” This cannot work. All the more so as
there are institutions which, historically, have been invented in order to put together
people who do not share the same ends – to have them contribute to the same practice.
Think of enterprise, or even of war! People might not have ends in common apart from
production or war deeds.
Simona CERUTTI – True, but let me reply: “consensus” does not mean that people always
agree.  Rather,  it  is  the  condition  –  the  condition  declared,  or  put  on  display  –  to
legitimize an action. But I agree that this is a relation of power. You silence the other
voices. This is far from being the same as to say that everybody agrees. But you may
nonetheless say that there is consensus.
Yves COHEN – So, this is perhaps what I call compromise.
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – In any case, both of you insist on the productive character
of conflict for a reflection on normativity. Simona, you hold that the conflict between two
norms represents the juncture from which new norms or new actions are created. And you,
Yves, explicitly remark that normativity is always directed “against” former norms.
Yves COHEN – Let us start off from Roberto Frega’s useful invitation to look at practices
as themselves normative.4 I agree with him, but I would add that the normativity of
practices  is  always  a  counter-normativity:  an  opposition  to  already  existing  norms.
Taylorism is a good case in point: it is a “device” to produce norms, which have been
established  at  the  expense  of  other  norms:  ordinary  norms  that  regulated  labour;
norms that workers had agreed on and fabricated by themselves, and which, at the
same  time,  protected  them  from  the  threat  of  entrepreneurs.  A  similar  dynamic
characterized Communism,  which aimed at  destroying the ordinary ways  in which
masses fought for themselves and the norms of typical social fights. By imposing other
forms of normativity, Communism wanted to steer masses toward revolution and turn
history for the better. So, power always establishes norms against other norms. At the
same time, ordinary practices always fabricate norms. I think we are a bit limited by
the classical idea of a norm as something that enables and constrains. This overlooks
the fact that every action entails a commentary to its norm; a criticism of the norm, as
limited as it  may be.  Three aspects:  norms are enabling,  constraining and open to
criticism.
Simona CERUTTI – This reminds me of a notion which the urban sociology of the last ten
years has been working on – namely the notion of acts of citizenship – as a means to
complicate the link between official discourses and everyday interactions. Lately, I have
been to Sciences Po to give a lecture on political mobilization. And as I talked about
labourers, people from the audience objected: This is not politics! The problem here is
the distinction between politics and everyday action. If a person says to another: “Don’t
jump the queue please – it’s not ok!,” this is an everyday conversation; but it is also
“encrusted” with criticism and normativity. This particular point is the object of very
recent sociological investigations. And while some social sciences are caught off-guard
by this overlapping of ordinary and normative acts, other social sciences are not. For
they show that this distinction is not essential; it simply marks a difference of degree.
Histoires pragmatiques
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
9
In this sense, acts of citizenship are practices within the political space, which carry
criticisms and make propositions.
Yves  COHEN –  Indeed.  And  a  similar  discourse  applies  to  the  worker  on  the  line.
Sometimes, the amount of criticism and proposition is an infinitesimal dimension of
practice. But it is there all the same. Sartre used to say: There is never a total absence of
freedom.  There is  always a  small  fragment  of  it.  I  would say:  a  small  fragment  of
criticism (or interpretation) of the norm. A fragment that sometimes grows into overt
resistance,  contestation,  even  revolution.  No  norm  can  be  other  than  counter-
normative.
Simona CERUTTI – But if you say “counter-normative,” you end up pitting one norm
against the people that oppose it. I think, instead, that there are many norms. We live
in a thick fabric of norms; we face a huge amount of normative centres. The state is one
of them. The family, the couple, the workplace are others. This normative thickness of
everyday life counters the traditional understanding of normativity, but also that of
“counter-normativity.” I don’t mean to say that there is no class struggle. But I do
believe  that  we  constantly  face  a  plurality  of  normative  universes.  I  found myself
working on sources that are similar to those on which E. P. Thompson drew to study
labour force. Thompson interpreted phenomena such as the Saint Monday,5 which was
the workers’ resistance to those norms that dictated the work schedule. In the cases on
which I have been working, however, the Saint Monday was not so much a resistance to
the norm as a parallel organization of working time. During Saint Mondays, people
wouldn’t stay at home with their arms folded, just to “resist.” Rather, they interpreted
it as a workday in which they would walk into other boutiques, would organize the
movability of workers, etc. But this system was, in turn, a normative system. There
were people fighting against that system as well.
Does this change anything? It seems to me that reconstructing the plurality of norms
amounts to admitting that conflict is everywhere. The space of conflict is the space of
interrelation. A source is not a description,  but is addressed to someone. And very
often,  it  entails  a conflict  – which is  not necessarily a political  conflict,  but it  is  a
conflict all the same.
Yves COHEN – We are less distant in our understanding than you think. I wrote an article
on “multiple authorities,” which dovetails with your idea of a multiplicity of normative
universes.
 Roberto  GRONDA &  Tullio  VIOLA –  A  last  question  on  the  issue  of  normativity.  In  your
analyses, actions that have a normative force tend to acquire a symbolic force that goes
beyond their pragmatic dimension. In the case of ancien régime acts of ownership (Cerutti),
we read about  people  who go to  the  houses  they  wish to  own and perform symbolic
actions, such as repeatedly opening doors and windows, in order to signal performatively
that  the  house  is  theirs.  In  Cohen’s  book,  the  commandment  of  the  chef,  when  it  is
embodied into a concrete artefact (for instance, a drawing or a plan) tends to acquire an
autonomous allure, to be revered as an artwork. Alternatively, the very image of the chef
may become the object of symbolic production. These phenomena seem to point to a tight
link between the pragmatic and the symbolic.
Simona CERUTTI – I don’t know – I really don’t – if I would talk about “symbolic” action
here.  Maybe  a  better  term  is  ritual,  which  also  encompasses  the  problem  of  the
effectiveness of action. The conditions of effectiveness of a regular action which I have
been singling out  in  my work –  i.e.,  its  unfolding without  contradiction,  its  being
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repeated over time, etc. – may also be seen to characterize ritual action. Therefore,
ritual  action  may  be  studied  from  the  viewpoint  of  normative  effectiveness.  This
certainly opens up an enormous field of research.
Yves COHEN – When looked at from the viewpoint of practice, institutional statuses,
scientific utterances, concepts and social categories no longer appear as fixed entities.
Rather, they resemble formal elements that need to be continually re-conceived, re-
composed, re-justified. The point is not to deny existence to forms by dissolving them
into practices; rather, it is to see them as a stage of practical activity, or as a manner of
composing the situation in which action unfolds. To talk about these elements we may
certainly use the word “symbolic”; but Simona’s use of the word “ritual” is very much
to the point, because the ritual is always a modality of practice; it points to a formal
moment within practice.
So, for instance, the relationship I establish between plan and situated action is not
aimed at destroying the autonomy of the plan. Rather, the plan appears within the
universe of action as one component amidst others – like norms, scientific utterances,
etc. Once again, historians of science may come in helpful. They suggest to stop looking
at  knowledge  in  an  abstract  sense,  and  to  start  looking  at  the  way  knowledge  is
effectively produced, and then at its concrete deployment within action, at the ways it
is questioned and re-articulated. The point is not to deny existence to formal elements,
but to study them as components of the dynamics of practice.
⁂
 Roberto GRONDA & Tullio VIOLA – A last, methodological question. As both of you conceive it,
pragmatic history primarily hinges on the categories deployed by actors. This stance has
deep-seated roots in pragmatist epistemology. At the same time, another major insight of
pragmatism is the emphasis on the habitual  dimension of  action.  From this angle,  the
purport  of  action always in  part  escapes the consciousness of  actors.  And in order  to
reconstruct it, we need the external perspective of observers. Do you think it is possible to
strike a balance between these two views?
Yves COHEN – I would put the same point in a slightly different way. The main gist of our
attempt  to  develop  a  pragmatic  history  is  related  to  the  difference  between  our
approach and that of another way of doing social science – a traditionally Durkheimian
way,  we  might  say  –  in  which  scholars  build  up  structures,  categories  of  social
determination,  and so forth.  Now,  if  we want to grasp all  the potentialities  of  our
research,  I  think  we  should  insist  on  the  analytical  emphasis  on  practices,  whose
relevance to the study of structures and historical contexts has not been completely
unpacked  yet.  The  question  we  should  ask  is:  What  is  the  mode  of  existence  of
structures  –  the materiality  of  their  existence?  We  have  been  looking  for  social
structures for so long, so many centuries! We should keep going in the other direction
and studying the creativity in, and of, the practices on any scale.
The methodological condition of pragmatic history is a certain quality of sources. You
cannot do pragmatic history if you do not have sources that “report” the activities of
people. And not all sources are well-suited for this enterprise. This is why I would not
dream of denying that other ways of doing history are possible: I just insist on my own
way of doing it, which hinges on the attempt to see sources as actions, as an element
that aims at doing something in its practical context.
Histoires pragmatiques
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
11
In any case, the question of actors’ versus observers’ categories is crucial. Bringing out
the categories  of  actors  is  a  necessary  condition if  we want  to  give  justice  to  the
“alterity” of history. This, however, does not prevent us from using our own categories
as well. Only, we ought to render explicit the uses we make of both sets of categories.
But there is yet another, pragmatic argument, which goes back to Polybius: I think that,
when doing pragmatic history, we need a certain familiarity with the experience we
study. I often think of what Marc Bloch said about writing the history of watermills. He
said: Go to the countryside; you will find ruins of watermills, and even if they’re not
those you are studying in your historical research, it will nonetheless give you an idea
of what a watermill was. Now that’s not exactly what I’m talking about, but... Even if
history becomes something like a “metaphor” of an experience that one has already
had, I nonetheless think that we do need a relationship with experience as a basis to
construct alterity. I have, for instance, worked in a factory. Back then I was Maoist. I
was a worker, I was engaged in politics, and I then reflected as a historian on the same
experiences  in  a  remote  past.  The  way  I  am dealing  with  practice  is  undoubtedly
marked by this
Simona CERUTTI –  For  me,  on the contrary,  the  metaphor  of  the past  as  a  foreign
country is predominant; history should be made against the grain of sources. This is why
I speak of empiricism as the result of inquiry, not as its degree zero. The point is to
create distance;  to undergo a process of  estrangement,  so as to perceive things that
would otherwise appear too close. Of course I can say: I’ve been to the market. But what
is a market, in the 18th century? I seek a sort of denaturalization of the object.
Yves COHEN – Well, I do think, instead, that we need some experiential relationship with
the object;  but  the point  is  that  this  relationship does not  dictate the economy of
inquiry! Historical work remains a work of fabrication, of strangeness. Still, we need
some sort of proximity to practice.  How would you go about making an acceptable
analysis of the practice if you have no idea whatsoever of what kind of practice you’re
dealing with?
NOTES
1. Cf.  Emmanuel Renault,  (2013),  “Dewey, Hook et Mao: quelques affinités entre marxisme et
pragmatisme,” Actuel Marx 54, 138-57; Hongliang Gu, (2014), “L’influence de Dewey sur le jeune
Mao,” Actuel Marx 56, 124-32.
2. Michel Foucault, (1994), “Table-ronde du 20 mai 1978,” in M. Perrot (ed.), M. Foucault, Dits et
écrits, vol. 4, Paris, Gallimard, 20-34.
3. In Reseaux, (1993), XI/62, 19-42.
4. Frega R., (2013), Les sources sociales de la normativité. Une théorie des pratiques normatives, Paris,
Vrin.
5. Saint Monday is the traditional phenomenon of absenteeism on mondays.
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